Now I firmly believe that “conceptual analysis,” taken as a search for necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of terms, or as a search for criteria for application by reference to which a term has the meaning it has, is a confused program, a philosophical chimera, a squaring of the circle, the misconceived child of a mistaken view of the nature of language and thought.
– Ruth Garrett Millikan, 1989
I’m with Millikan. Disappointing that the chimera still haunts philosophy.
In three earlier posts I outlined what I believe to be some of the core underlying problems that have inspired the Occupy Wall Street movement – problems with our current economics, politics and society – even if the Occupy movement itself is yet to identify these problems itself while it rails against the symptoms of inequality and greed. In the next couple of posts I’ll offer some solutions to these three underlying problems.
The good news is they’re fixable. The bad news is that we have to do the fixing by fixing ourselves. And that’ll take time. And discipline. There are no quick fixes. That’s why I refer to my approach to fixing these deep societal problems as the Slow Revolution.
There are two types of people in this world: those who like dichotomies, and those who don’t. This post is for the former.
Metaethics is riddled with dichotomies. And, unhelpfully, they often cut across each other in unpredictable ways. On top of that, not every metaethicist employs the terms in the same ways, meaning some dichotomies are rendered differently in different texts.
So, here is my understanding of the key dichotomies in metaethics (with my preferred options). I’m not entirely sure I have characterised them all correctly, or that I’m not missing any salient points. Please feel free to criticise or revise this list in the comments:
Realism vs. anti-realism
- Realism: moral facts exist
- Often cashed out as objective prescriptive facts
- “objective, intrinsic, prescriptivity” (Mackie, 1975 – who, by the way, thought these facts didn’t exist)
- Or facts about a property of goodness in things/actions
- Example proponents: G.E. Moore, M. Smith, P. Bloomfield, a (disappointing) heap of others
- Anti-realism: moral properties don’t exist
- Example proponents: Mackie, Joyce, Greene
- I fall within this camp as I don’t believe objective, prescriptive moral facts exist, and use evolved moral psychology to show why we might erroneously think the do
Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism
- Cognitivism: moral utterances are statements of fact and have truth values
- Eg: “murder is wrong” is either true or false
- A descriptive semantic thesis about moral discourse, not a prescriptive or ontological thesis about moral statements
- Strong cognitivism: as above but the facts are cognitively accessible
- Non-cognitivism: moral utterances are statements of affect or preference and don’t have truth values
- Example proponents: Blackburn, Ayer, Stevenson
- I consider this a spurious distinction as everyday moral discourse is muddled, and most moral utterances have a cognitive and an affective component: moral intuitions (immediate impressions of permissibility/impermissibility of an act) are typically non-cognitivist; while the post-hoc rationalisations of moral norms are typically cognitivist
Naturalism vs. non-naturalism
- Naturalism: a form of cognitivism and realism that states that moral properties exist and they are natural properties or moral statements are rendered true or false by facts about natural states of affairs
- Facts about happiness (Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer) or about neurological states (Sam Harris)
- Non-naturalism: a form of cognitivism and realism that states that moral properties exist and they are non-natural properties
- Example proponents: G.E. Moore
- I reject both these formations as they’re dependent on moral realism. Instead I adopt an anti-realist naturalism that says moral phenomena are analysable in purely naturalistic terms, but this alone doesn’t imply any binding normativity, similar to Joshua Greene, Michael Ruse (I think…) and the so-called Duke Naturalists
Internalism vs. externalism
- Internalism: moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating
- It’s somehow contradictory to believe that ‘x is good’ and yet have no inclination towards doing ‘x’
- Example proponents: Michael Smith
- Externalism: moral beliefs are not intrinsically motivating and require some other impetus to motivate moral behaviour
- It’s possible to believe ‘x is good’ and not be motivated to do ‘x’
- This is another dichotomy I reject as I take a softer psychological approach that suggests moral norms are not bindingly prescriptive nor intrinsically motivating, although we are often internally emotionally motivated to act in accordance to the norms to which we subscribe (akrasia not withstanding), and we want people to behave like this, but we often need ‘external’ motivation, such as threat of coercion, to motivate conformity and prevent bouts of akrasia
Absolutism vs. relativism
- Absolutism: there is one moral standard that is fixed
- Applies without contingency
- Can be objective (fixed by facts in the world or God’s will)
- Can be subjective (fixed by the whim of an authority)
- Relativism: moral standards are indexed to some value
- Indexed to culture, group of people, environment etc
- Can be objective (x group/circumstances always implies y morality)
- Can be subjective (x group/circumstances can choose y or z morality)
- I am absolutely not an absolutist, rather more a pluralist along the lines of David Wong, where there I argue there are many ways of solving the problems of social living that morality is constructed to solve, but there are better and worse ways in different environments, and there are clearly some very bad ways
Categorical vs. hypothetical
- Categorical imperatives: moral norms are binding regardless of an individual’s ends or desires
- Hypothetical imperatives: moral norms are binding contingent on an individual’s ends or desires
- I fall into the hypothetical camp, with norms binding hypothetically, contingent on our desire to serve our own interests in a social context, given the assumption (usually true) that acting in accordance with the constructed moral code will advance our own interests better than the alternative of not acting in accordance with a moral code
Not even sure if the last one is strictly metaethical, or more a normative ethical thesis. But hey.
What is society? Or, more importantly, what’s it for? And how do we want it to be?
It seems there are precious few asking questions like these. And while the Occupy Wall Street movement appears to be rebelling against the way society is structured today, and the direction in which it’s travelling, this rebellion is only the first step. Identifying that there’s a problem is one thing, diagnosing it in detail another. And then there’s the ultimate goal of figuring out how to fix it.
In this post I offer my take on the underlying issues with our conception of society and its function that I believe underlie the Occupy Wall Street movement’s grievances, and in a future post in this series, I’ll offer some suggested alternatives that might take us in a more fruitful direction.
This is part two of my series on Beyond Occupy Wall Street. You can find part one, where I put the boot into contemporary economic dogma here.
In this post, I focus on politics. Or, more specifically, on the failure of the 20th century political paradigm to accord with a 21st century world. Basically, the Left-Right political spectrum as we know it is defunct and, as a result, we’re seeing the political parties of the last century struggle in many democracies around the world, not least in Anglophone world.
In the U.S., Obama was supposed to liberate the country from the bitter partisan politics of the Bush Jr. era, where the Left and the Right had become violently polarised and infected by base-appeasing populism, meanwhile lacking the courage to make the tough decisions that are required to set the country straight. But even Obama – with his feel-good “there’s only the United States of America” – failed to bring the warring parties together.
The recent debt crisis is but one of many, many examples of the abject failure of the two major U.S. parties to put their knives down and govern in the interests of the nation. Not to mention the banality of Fox News and the Tea Party, offering hopelessly simplistic solutions to complex problems – some real, and some fictitious.
In the U.K. and Australia the last elections resulted in hung parliaments, largely due to disillusionment with the major parties and the parlous calibre of political debate. Both countries saw a protest vote lobbed against a long-term sitting government that had gone stale, yet the voters proved unenthused at the prospect of the alternative governments on offer. The result is minority government, with uneasy coalitions formed, which are unlikely to survive the next election.